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WORD GAMES, WAR GAMES 
Diane H. Mazur* 
DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY. 
By Janet E. Halley. Durham: Duke University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 
159. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95. 
In 1993, the country's interest in the issue of military service by gay 
citizens escalated to a level that can only be described as a national 
obsession, and "obsession" is by no means too strong a term. The 
subject of gay servicemembers was debated within all three branches 
of government, all ranks of the military, and all walks of civilian life.1 
The issue of military service by gay citizens became a line in the sand, 
a cultural standoff on issues as sensitive and disparate as sexuality, pa­
triotism, civil rights, and civic obligation. 
Janet Halley2 returns to that time of obsession in Don't: A 
Reader's Guide to the Military's Anti-Gay Policy. The title derives, of 
course, from "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the popular name reflective of 
a somewhat simplified understanding of the military policy that even­
tually emerged from the debate. Halley's work compiles a painstaking 
and meticulous "archaeology" (p. 14) of the layers of influence that 
progressively shaped the nature of the military's policy on gay service­
members, from the earliest days of President Clinton's intention to lift 
the ban through the final statutory codification of what is still de­
scribed, perhaps misleadingly, as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." In ex­
plaining the process by which "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" became the 
legacy of a failed attempt to end the exclusion of gay citizens from na­
tional service, Halley unearths its interpretive history "controversy by 
controversy, line by line, and at times even word by word" (p. 14). 
The centerpiece of Don't is the firm conclusion that the present 
policy is "much, much worse" for gay servicemembers than the policy 
in effect when President Clinton assumed office (p. 1). In answering 
the question "What went wrong?," Halley seeks to trace cause and ef­
fect to discover the independent semantic influences that were 
brought to bear on the 1993 policy revisions. Potential sources of in­
fluence - President Clinton, Congress, the military, legal challenges 
* Professor of Law, University of Florida. Visiting Professor of Law, University of 
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1. See Steven Waldman, The Battle of the Gay Ban, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 42. 
2. Professor of Law and Robert E. Paradise Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School. 
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brought by gay servicemembers, defenses to those challenges crafted 
by the Department of Justice, and judicial rulings in response to those 
challenges and defenses - are investigated and assigned varying 
amounts of blame for acts of commission or omission that, in Halley's 
view, led to the enactment of the more burdensome "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell." 
It is undoubtedly true that the climate for gay servicemembers has 
become much, much worse since the 1993 debate.3 That change in 
climate, however, has very little to do with the intricate legal seman­
tics, scope, or substance of the legislative. revisions leading to "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell." The legacy of the failed debate is not a statute that 
is in scope or substance any different from the previous policy; rather, 
it is a military with a greater institutional commitment to enforcing the 
exclusionary policy. 
Halley's archaeology is as important for its unintentional illustra­
tions as it is for its intentional ones. Its exhaustive chronology of years 
of legal advocacy on behalf of gay servicemembers is illuminating 
more for what it fails to find than for what it does find. It reveals, but 
only in a between-the-lines fashion, an important aspect of "What 
went wrong?" in the attempt to bury a policy of exclusion. This un­
examined factor is the failure to understand the institutional context 
of the military, or the practical, factual ways in which military policy 
impacts the lives of gay servicemembers. 
The door to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as the prevailing under­
standing of a gay citizen's opportunity for national service was first 
cracked opened, surprisingly, by legal advocates for gay plaintiffs. 
Years before President Clinton's involvement precipitated a more 
acute controversy, those seeking to overturn the ban had already initi­
ated a high-stakes legal game of "chicken" with the military over its 
exclusionary policy.4 This was a game in which both sides seemed con­
tent to trade legal arguments confined to less-than-honest semantics 
- "word games" - rather than engage each, other on a level that 
would recognize the practical effect their efforts would have on gay 
servicemembers. In this battle of word games, gay servicemembers 
were ultimately the only losers, and Halley's book is an accidental ar­
chaeology of this strategic conflict as well. 
3. See SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE 
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE," (Mar. 15, 1999) 
<http://www.sldn.org/reports/fifthl> (documenting increases in anti-gay harassment, viola­
tions of investigatory restrictions, and discharges of gay personnel in the years since "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell" was enacted). 
4. See Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
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The twin linchpins of the legal controversy concerning military 
service by gay citizens have been the words "status" and "conduct" -
their meaning, their distinction, and their correlation with each other. 
It is shameful that such an important issue of civic obligation should 
be decided on the interpretation of two small words, but these two 
words now constitute the whole of the debate. 
Halley's archaeology begins when the issue became a matter of 
public concern: when President Clinton declared his intention, shortly 
after his inauguration, to end the categorical exclusion of gay citizens 
from military service. The common understanding of Clinton's objec­
tive was that a better, fairer policy would "mark[] the end of dis­
charging servicemembers for their status and the beginning of dis­
charging them for their conduct" (p. 1). Under such a policy, 
servicemembers would be sanctioned not for "who they are" (in other 
words, simply because they are gay) but instead for "what they do" (if 
they behave in a way harmful to the military mission) (p. 1). 
As Halley explains, one rational way to illustrate the difference be­
tween a policy based on status and one based on conduct would be to 
highlight the significance of misconduct in a military environment (p. 
35). Acts of misconduct such as sexual harassment or sexual assault, 
for example ("what they do"), would be punishable whether commit­
ted by straight or gay servicemembers ("who they are"); individuals 
who do not engage in misconduct and who are otherwise qualified 
should be equally eligible to serve. This simple and intuitive under­
standing of the relationship between concepts of status and conduct, 
however, was fleeting and largely disregarded during the debate, de­
spite President Clinton's naively persistent belief that a misconduct­
oriented policy would be the central objective of any revision.5 
Once any rational distinction between "who they are" and "what 
they do" is lost, concepts of status and conduct can be manipulated to 
justify exclusion as easily as to justify inclusion. Halley observes that 
"[  e ]very moving part of the new policy is designed to look like conduct 
regulation in order to hide the fact that it turns decisively on status" 
(p. 2). "What actually emerged from the legislative process was a 
complex new set of regulations that discharge people on grounds that 
5. See, e.g., The Transition: Excerpts from President-E/ect's News Conference in 
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at AlS ("[T]he issue ought to be conduct. Has 
anybody done anything which would disqualify them, whether it's [the] Tailhook Scandal or 
something else."); William J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and 
Lesbians in the Military, in 29 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1369, 
1370 (1993) ("The policy I am announcing today is, in my judgment, the right thing to do and 
the best way to do it. It is right because it provides greater protection to those who happen 
to be homosexual and want to serve their country honorably in uniform, obeying all the 
military's rules against sexual misconduct."). 
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tie status to conduct and conduct to status in surprising, devious, in­
genious, perverse, and frightening ways" (p. 4). 
How was such a simple and intuitive understanding of the relation­
ship between status and conduct lost? How did the definition of con­
duct become so malleable and elusive that it could no longer be distin­
guished from status? Because the thesis of Don't follows an intricate 
semantic path through the language of military policy, any review 
must set out at least the beginning and the end of the exercise - the 
language of the regulatory and statutory schemes that defined the 
military's treatment of gay servicemembers both before and after the 
origin of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Only then can the book's claim 
that the current policy is "much, much worse than its predecessor" (p. 
1) be put in context. 
The military's policy concerning gay servicemembers prior to its 
reexamination during the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate was incor­
porated in the Department of Defense regulation6 that Halley terms 
"the Old DOD Policy" (pp. 19-20). The Old DOD Policy opened with 
precatory language asserting a military necessity for the exclusion of 
gay servicemembers: "Homosexuality is incompatible with military 
service. The presence in the military environment of persons who en­
gage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate 
a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the 
accomplishment of the military mission.m The operative section of 
the regulation, however - the section setting out the elements that 
had to be proved to discharge an individual - required the following 
specific findings: 
A member shall be separated under this section if one or more of the 
following approved findings is made: 
(1) The member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited 
another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . .  
(2) The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual . . . unless 
there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual . . . .  8
Two definitional sections in the Old DOD Policy elaborated on the 
above disqualifying elements. A "homosexual act" was defined as 
"bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between 
members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires. "9 
A "homosexual" was defined as "a person, regardless of sex, who en­
gages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual 
acts."10 
6. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. 1, § H (1994) (superseded). 
7. § H(l)(a). 
8. § H(l)(c)(l)-(2). 
9. § H(l)(b)(3). 
10. § H(l)(b)(l). 
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Under this prior regulatory scheme, therefore, the military could 
prove a basis for discharge in either of two ways. A servicemember 
could be separated upon a finding that he or she committed a "homo­
sexual act" (a "conduct" case) or made a statement acknowledging his 
or her homosexuality (a "status" case).11 Halley describes the Old 
DOD Policy as "explicitly status-based" (p. 3) in that an individual's 
statement concerning his or her status ("that he or she is a homosex­
ual") was service-disqualifying. Furthermore, the only defense to that 
disqualifying statement was equally status-based, requiring the mili­
tary to find that the individual "is not a homosexual." 
The federal codification of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,''12 which 
Halley terms "the Statute" (p. 20), largely tracks the Old DOD Policy 
in its basic form. The Statute similarly disqualifies citizens from mili­
tary service on the basis of certain acts and certain statements. It dif­
fers, however, in its attempt to remove any connotation of status 
regulation. The Statute seeks to limit the legal significance of terms 
such as "homosexuality" and "homosexual,'' confining its reach to dis­
qualifications that, in the military's view, can arguably be described as 
what people do and not who they are: 
(b) Policy. - A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the 
armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if 
one or more of the following findings is made and approved in accor­
dance with procedures set forth in such regulations: 
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solic­
ited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . .  
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bi­
sexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further finding . . .  that 
the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person who en­
gages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or in­
tends to engage in homosexual acts.13 
A definitional section similarly elaborates on the operational ele­
ments, with the same objective of removing status-based charges and 
defenses: 
(f) Definitions. - In this section: 
(1) The term "homosexual" means a person, regardless of sex, who 
engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or in­
tends to engage in homosexual acts, and includes the terms "gay" or 
"lesbian". [sic] 
(3) The term "homosexual act" means -
11. "Status" cases may also be referred to as "statement" cases. The use of either in this 
Review is synonymous. 
12. 10 u.s.c. § 654 (1994). 
13. 10 u.s.c. § 654(b)(l)-(2). 
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(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, 
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sex­
ual desires; and 
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand 
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described 
in subparagraph (A).14 
A reader of the "before" and "after" versions of the military's 
policy on service by gay citizens could not be faulted for failing to no­
tice much of a difference. Acts of physical intimacy and statements 
acknowledging homosexuality still constitute bases for discharge. 
Disqualifying acts of intimacy, however, are now somewhat more 
broadly defined. As Halley notes, a nonplatonic holding of hands with 
someone of the same sex would support discharge from the military 
under the Statute because it would "demonstrate a propensity" to en­
gage in prohibited sexual conduct (p. 4), even though handholding 
would not have constituted a "homosexual act" as previously defined. 
A much more subtle textual revision was also made with respect to 
"statement" or "status" cases. Under the Statute, a servicemember 
who has made a statement acknowledging his or her homosexuality 
can be retained in the military provided the servicemember can dem­
onstrate that he or she has no propensity to engage in same-sex inti­
macy; the servicemember does not need to prove, as under the Old 
DOD Policy, that he or she is not a homosexual. 
If one were searching for the ultimate definition of a distinction 
without a difference, it seems one could find it in the revisions made to 
military policy as a result of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate. 
Halley argues, however, that the present Statute is more "arbitrary, 
wide-reaching, and unpredictable" (p. 2) than its predecessor. She 
also contends that the Statute's coercive manipulation of status and 
conduct against gay servicemembers has its origin in the Justice 
Department's disingenuous application of an even more disingenuous 
opinion of the Supreme Court. 
II. A WAR OF WORDS: STATUS AND CONDUCT 
Halley finds the beginning of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in Bowers v. 
Hardwick,15 the uniformly criticized decision16 that declined to find any 
constitutional right to privacy that would protect two adults of the 
same sex from criminal prosecution for consensual sexual intimacy. 
"The new regulations . . .  translate the rhetoric of that baneful decision 
into rules of conduct for everyday life in the military" (p. 5). Halley 
14. 10 u.s.c. § 654 (f)(l)-(3). 
15. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
16. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
631, 633. 
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explains that Hardwick provided the model for the military's later 
manipulation of the status/conduct distinction by refusing to recognize 
that the Georgia statute at issue defined sodomy without reference to 
the sex of the partners (pp. 7-8). The Court had to deliberately disre­
gard the law's application to heterosexual sodomy to justify its deci­
sion on the basis of historical animus toward gay people. Only then, as 
Halley explains, could a sex-neutral sodomy provision be upheld on 
the basis that it "rationally expressed a popular judgment that homo­
sexuality was morally wrong" (p. 9). This facile interchange between 
conduct and status, according to Halley, is what made Hardwick such 
a perfect vehicle for anti-gay military policy. "[T]he Court's logic ap­
pears to depend on acts, but actually depends on persons."17 
Why the importance of concepts of status and conduct? Legal ma­
neuvering over status and conduct with respect to gay servicemembers 
actually predates Hardwick,18 arising instead from earlier criminal 
"status" cases such as Robinson v. California19 and Powell v. Texas.20 
Robinson and Powell stand for the proposition that an individual can­
not be criminally prosecuted merely for having a "status" such as ad­
diction to drugs or to alcohol; a criminal conviction must be based on 
specific provable conduct, such as the possession or sale of narcotics or 
an incident of public intoxication.21 
These criminal status cases have always been a poor fit with mili­
tary discrimination cases because proceedings against gay service­
members rarely involve criminal charges. Although the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice includes a criminal sodomy law22 - applica-
17. P. 9; see also pp. 71-72 (finding the genesis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in Hardwick's 
"management of the status/conduct distinction"). It may be a stretch to characterize 
Hardwick as a "status" case in the same sense that status is employed in cases concerning the 
military's exclusionary policy. Halley states that Hardwick provides "an offer of immunity 
to anyone willing to identify as heterosexual," p. 10, but that is almost certainly incorrect. A 
self-identified heterosexual who engaged, for whatever reason, in an act of same-sex sodomy 
would not be immunized from prosecution based on his or her seimal orientation. It would 
be more accurate to state that the opinion rewrote the sodomy statute as if it were limited by 
biological sex, with sodomy constituting a crime only when committed, for example, by two 
males. While Hardwick is factually and legally illogical, based on a "very sloppy, inaccurate, 
self-blinding history," p. 9, it does not rely on confusion between status and conduct. 
18. See Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir. 1985) ("Matthews has not chal­
lenged the Army's right to disenroll her for her homosexual conduct, but only for her 
status . . . .  "); Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980) 
("[T]he Army's policy of discharging people simply for having homosexual personalities also 
offends privacy interests . . . .  "). 
19. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (reversing criminal conviction for the status of having an addic­
tion to narcotics as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment). 
20. 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion) (upholding criminal convic­
tion for public drunkenness; distinguishing Robinson on the basis that defendant engaged in 
specific prohibited conduct on a particular occasion). 
21. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
22. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1994). 
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ble to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct - discharges of gay 
servicemembers very rarely involve sodomy charges.23 Under the lan­
guage of the military's policy governing the administrative discharge 
of gay servicemembers, whether before or after the "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell" revisions, a range of behavior far more comprehensive than an 
act of sodomy constitutes a basis for discharge. 
More importantly, criminal status cases have been a poor fit be­
cause, outside the criminal context, status and conduct can never be 
neatly separated from each other. In criminal cases, conduct can be 
set apart from status because some particular conduct must always be 
specifically identified, charged, and proven. In military discrimination 
cases, in contrast, specifically charged conduct is often not at issue. 
Status and conduct are not as easily distinguished when, for example, 
the controversy concerns proof that a servicemember is not a homo­
sexual (under the Old DOD Policy) or has no propensity to engage in 
homosexual acts (under the Statute). The practical difficulty of de­
fining these elements solely in terms of status, however, has not pre­
vented advocates for gay military plaintiffs from forcing an artificial 
distinction from conduct in an attempt to establish some status-based 
constitutional protection. That effort has contributed to the current 
state of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" as much as the efforts of those op­
posed to the service of gay citizens. 
Advocates for gay plaintiffs have traditionally chosen to litigate 
pure "statement" cases when challenging the military's exclusionary 
policies, for the most part conceding the military's interest in exclud­
ing those who engage in, or have an intent or propensity to engage in, 
any form of same-sex intimate conduct.24 The battle is drawn on plain­
tiffs' contention that a servicemember's gay sexual orientation, or 
status, is unrelated to any intent or propensity to engage in gay inti­
macy or conduct. As a result, according to this argument, service­
members who make statements identifying themselves as gay should 
23. See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 756-58, 787 (1993) (testimony of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; Maj. Gen. John T. Otgen, Senior Member, Military Working Group); THEODORE R. 
SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEFENSE PERSONNEL SEC. REsEARCH & EDUC. CrR., 
NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY 21-22, app. B 
(1988), reprinted in GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS 27-28, 81-84 
(Kate Dyer ed., 1990). 
24. One notable exception has been Chai Feldblum, a law professor at Georgetown 
University Law Center. See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: 
Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 294 (1996) ("The intense effort on the part of 
some gay legal advocates to avoid the Hardwick trap by decoupling sexual orientation from 
sexual conduct leads to some Alice-in-Wonderland claims, which might be amusing if the 
outcome of the effort were not so potentially destructive."); see also Chandler Burr, Friendly 
Fire: How Politics Shaped Policy on Gays in the Military, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54 
(highlighting Professor Feldblum's service as the legal adviser for the Campaign for Military 
Service and her singular effort to discourage reliance on a distinction between status and 
conduct). 
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not be subject to discharge because their statements demonstrate 
nothing about the risk that is the military's purported concern: the 
risk that same-sex intimacy is more likely to occur within the military 
if self-identified gay citizens are permitted to serve. 
The fundamental weakness of the status/conduct distinction as 
employed in discrimination cases extends beyond its faulty application 
to gay servicemembers. Its weakness is that "status" never exists in a 
vacuum; it is always defined, at some level, by reference to the conduct 
from which it is generated. Halley offers several examples of legal 
status akin to sexual orientation, such as husband and wife, serf and 
prince, and felon (p. 29). None of these statuses, of course, can be 
achieved without some form of associated conduct; one cannot "be" a 
husband or wife, for example, without taking part in a ceremony of 
marriage and subsequently engaging in the activities of life as a couple 
rather than as a single individual. The mistake in adopting a forced 
distinction between status and conduct on behalf of gay servicemem­
bers is found in the assumption that it is possible to be just metaphysi­
cally gay - a sterile, stark orientation or status - and not engage in 
conduct, or have any propensity to engage in conduct, that is inextri­
cably associated with that status. 
In Don't, Halley has a conflicted perspective on the status/conduct 
distinction as employed in military discrimination cases. She does rec­
ognize the absurdity of arguing that statements of sexual orientation 
are irrelevant to military judgments concerning future sexual behavior 
when she writes that: 
While it might have been plausible for [plaintiffs] to claim that a 
servicemember should not be discharged on the basis of conduct for 
which there is no proof, it is quite a different matter to claim that his or 
her self-description as "homosexual" refers to "status" alone and has 
nothing to do with homosexual conduct. [p. 62] 
At the same time, however, she lapses into frustration over the legal 
consequences of practical reality, characterizing any suggestion that 
statements concerning sexual orientation are indicative of propensity 
for conduct as "merest supposition" (p. 113) or "freewheeling law­
yering" (pp. 138-39 n.12). "The overarching mechanism of the new 
military anti-gay policy is not status or conduct, but a newly volatile, 
artifactual relationship between them" (p. 126). 
As much as Halley criticizes the military's interpretation of the re­
lationship between status and conduct, she seems to admit that the 
concepts cannot be separated. Her objection may be instead that the 
status/conduct distinction, initially employed by advocates for gay 
plaintiffs despite its artificiality, was ultimately turned around and 
used to construct an equally irrational "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" regime 
that left no realistic window for military service by gay citizens. Halley 
aptly captures the centrality of "propensity" to this exclusionary ef­
fort, a concept that highlights the link between status and conduct and 
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allows the military to sweep a "truly startling" (p. 108) range of be­
havior within the scope of the Statute. 
Halley saves particular criticism for the Statute's use of propensity 
as a disqualification for military service. Recall that, under the 
Statute, a servicemember who makes a statement that he or she is gay 
must disprove any propensity to engage in same-sex intimacy to avoid 
discharge. Halley argues that this burden, also termed the "opportu­
nity to rebut" (p. 86), is unfair to the servicemember because propen­
sity "is an ambiguous term, referring just as much to homosexual 
status as to homosexual acts" (p. 16). While Halley is correct that 
propensity is well described as a hybrid of status and conduct, it is 
hardly ambiguous. The status of being gay (an issue under the Old 
DOD Policy) can reasonably be described as comprising a propensity 
to engage in the conduct of same-sex intimacy (the substituted linguis­
tic focus of the Statute ).25 Taking the reverse perspective, having a 
propensity to engage in certain behavior is just another way of de­
scribing one's orientation or status. The terms of the Statute are nei­
ther "new" (p. 57) nor a "novelty" (p. 66); they are merely the playing 
pieces of word games designed to exclude the same servicemembers as 
before while creating the appearance of concern for conduct rather 
than status. 
It is ironic that Halley complains of the unfairness of having to 
prove a negative: proof that an individual has no propensity for same­
sex intimacy despite his or her self-identification as gay. This burden 
was the inevitable end point of a litigation strategy on behalf of gay 
servicemembers arguing that statements of status indicated nothing 
about propensity for conduct.26 The military may have discovered an 
advantage in co-opting this strategy and asking that gay servicemem­
bers be forced to prove what their lawyers had always insisted was 
true. The strategy backfired, of course, once plaintiffs realized that 
they now carried the burden of proving something that was always in­
herently ridiculous. It should not be surprising that attempts by gay 
25. One need not believe that "status define[s] conduct" or that "the possibility of con­
duct was conclusive proof of its actuality," p. 85, to accept that sexual orientation serves as a 
means to describe propensity for conduct. Professor Halley has employed this common­
sense understanding of sexual orientation in an earlier analysis of sexual identity issues. See 
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989). "Thus, 'gays' and 'gay men and lesbians' 
refer to people who have acknowledged, at least to themselves, that their sexual desires or 
practices are often, predominantly, or entirely homoerotic." Id. at 916 n.5. 
26. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) ("Nevertheless, 
Steffan, in order to make his point, would have us see homosexual status - which is all that 
he should be thought to have acknowledged - as conceptually unrelated to homosexual 
conduct.") (affirming 1987 discharge under pre-"Don't ASk, Don't Tell" regulations). 
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servicemembers to disprove any propensity to lead gay lives have been 
largely unsuccessful.27 
The disaster of relying on a distinction between status and conduct 
demonstrates the danger of crafting legal arguments without reference 
to practical consequence. Once status and conduct were outlined as 
nonoverlapping entities, unrelated to and uncorrelated with each 
other, it became a much smaller step for the military narrowly to de· 
fine "mere status" as some imperceptible state of being. Conven· 
iently, as soon as status becomes perceptible, it potentially becomes 
conduct subject to the military's control. By rigidly defining status as 
"not conduct," and conduct as "not status," status itself could be 
drained of all significance. Halley recognizes the military's theft and 
redeployment of the status/conduct distinction, noting that "[c]onduct 
is, at least in a military context, always public while status is an inner 
and hence potentially secret characteristic of persons" (p. 30). She 
fails, however, to assign responsibility for its creation. Both sides at· 
tempted to win points with irrationality; an irrational policy should 
have been a foreseeable result. 
III. THE DANGERS OF ISOLATIONISM: LAW OUT OF CONTEXT 
To understand the "legal discourses" of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 
Halley counsels the reader to "pay attention to the peculiarities of par· 
ticular institutional settings" (pp. 11·12). Left unstated in her history, 
however, is the fact that advocates for gay servicemembers have made 
little effort to understand the military institutional setting within which 
the exclusionary policy has operated both before and after "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell." Given the historical bias against the military and 
military service held by gay advocacy groups,28 it is likely that this ex· 
periential gap contributed to litigation choices that, in the long run, 
were counterproductive to the cause. 
Why, for example, did the policy that emerged from the debate 
center on notions of "Don't Ask" and "Don't Tell"? The Statute is 
asymmetrically silent with respect to "Don't Ask"; its benefits, such as 
27. See pp. 99-105. Halley also notes with disapproval that the most successful rebuttal 
strategy to counter the presumption of propensity arising from a servicemember's statement 
that he or she is gay has been the production of evidence that the servicemember is, in fact, 
fundamentally heterosexual. These "affirmations of heterosexual status" would demon­
strate, in essence, that the original statement was an incorrect self-characterization. P. 100. 
Halley believes this is an inappropriate distinction based on status, but in what other way 
could a servicemember rebut a propensity for gay conduct, when gay orientation is just an­
other way to describe a propensity for gay conduct? 
28. See pp. 23-24; see also Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays 
in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 223, 272 (1996) [hereinaf­
ter Mazur, Unknown Soldier] ("While [gay activists] realized the importance of equal access 
to the performance of public service, military service was not the kind of public service they 
were interested in performing." (footnote omitted)). 
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they are, are found within implementing regulations by the 
Department of Defense. First, new recruits are no longer asked at in­
duction whether they are gay or have engaged in same-sex intimacy.29 
Second, current servicemembers should be questioned only if a com­
mander has "credible information that there is a basis for discharge" 
under the Statute - something more than "rumor, suspicion, or capri­
cious claims" or "the opinions of others" that a servicemember is 
gay.30 Halley concludes that President Clinton made a very poor trade 
when he acceded to "Don't Tell" in exchange for the relatively trivial 
benefits of "Don't Ask." "[W]hat he did not anticipate was that be­
tween 'don't ask' and 'don't tell' lay ample territory for anti-gay 
status-based regulation" (p. 48). 
The military's determination to eliminate any opportunity for 
"telling" is in part the continuation of a policy that already prohibited 
statements of self-identification by gay servicemembers. More signifi­
cantly, however, the military's focus on the importance of "Don't 
Tell" was likely a reaction to the nature of test cases advanced by gay 
servicemembers. By the time of the national conversation concerning 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the standard legal challenge to the exclu­
sionary policy had taken the form of a "pure status" claim, initiated by 
a servicemember's public announcement that he was gay.31 
Halley observes that the "chief unresolved issue" in drafting revi­
sions to the policy was "whether the military could discharge service­
members who had engaged in no provable same-sex erotic acts but 
who stated that they were gay" (p. 70). This issue received the most 
attention, however, only because advocates had been framing their 
claims in terms of latitude for public announcement, a context that 
was unrepresentative of the manner in which the policy routinely af-
29. See Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction, DOD Di­
rective 1304.26, enclosure 1.2.8.1 (Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>. This procedural 
change, however, was the smallest of concessions by the military, carrying no practical con­
sequence whatsoever. I doubt the induction questions were effective in excluding any gay 
citizens from the military; everyone, obviously, answers in the negative. 
30. Enlisted Administrative Separations (Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries into Ho­
mosexual Conduct), DOD Directive 1332.14, enclosure 3.A4.1.3.l, enclosure 3.A4.1.3.3.3 
(Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil> [hereinafter Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquir­
ies]. Similar provisions control the discharge of officer personnel. See Separation of Regular 
Commissioned Officers, DOD Directive 1332.30 (Dec. 21, 1993) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>. 
31. I use the non-gender-neutral "he" deliberately, because the standard legal chal­
lenges at the time were all filed on behalf of male servicemembers. See Meinhold v. United 
States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (statement made to ABC's "World 
News Tonight"); Thome v. United States Dep't of Defense, 945 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Va. 
1996) (statement made to ABC's "Nightline"), affd per curiam, No. 97-1121, 1998 WL 
163632 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 371 (1998); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 
439 (D.D.C. 1993) (statement made to ABC's "World News Tonight"). Other servicemem­
bers' challenges were based on oral or written declarations to their commanders. See 
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260 (D. Md. 
1995), aff d per curiam and mem., 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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fected the lives of gay servicemembers. Advocates could have chosen 
instead to defend servicemembers who had been discharged after dis­
covery that they, like their heterosexual colleagues, led lives that in­
cluded intimacy, but those cases were largely disregarded because they 
failed to fit within artificial parameters that required a bare statement 
of self-identification coupled with a denial (however incredible) of in­
terest in intimacy.32 As Halley notes, "advocates are under rhetorical 
constraints that make such an assertion of a right to status protection 
almost de rigueur" (p. 116). 
Once Congress became obsessed with the revelations gay service­
members might make about themselves in a military context, the dis­
cussion shifted to the military's investigatory interest in the discovery 
and deterrence of this prohibited "telling." Unfortunately, when in­
vestigations can be initiated on the basis of any information more sub­
stantive than mere rumor, suspicion, or opinion, a simple failure of se­
crecy may become indistinguishable from "telling." Perhaps this 
threshold of required evidence provides some limited protection 
against the most indiscriminate intrusions, but it still leaves gay 
servicemembers with the impossible obligation to maintain complete 
secrecy concerning the routine nature of what they do, where they go, 
and whom they see, far exceeding the scope of information more di­
rectly associated with intimate behavior. Kay Kavanagh has elo­
quently explained why the policy's prohibition of statements con­
cerning sexual orientation is not its most intrusive burden: "Rather, it 
involves making truly unremarkable disclosures, such as with whom 
one goes grocery shopping, shares a checking account, takes a vaca­
tion . . . ; from whom one receives a phone call, a message, or flowers 
on one's birthday; and with or without whom one goes home for the 
holidays. "33 
Advocates for gay servicemembers have never completely under­
stood the consequences of their decision to favor public statements of 
orientation over the inescapably ordinary conduct of everyday life -
conduct that is almost always private but almost never secret. Lati­
tude for public announcement offers nothing to gay servicemembers if 
unaccompanied by latitude for the routine indicia of intimate life. 
Status protection can shield only the most superficial of statements; 
matters of greater significance will inevitably be construed as conduct 
subject to investigation. 
32 See Mazur, Unknown Soldier, supra note 28, at 231-32 (discussing Walmer v. United 
States Dep't of Defense, 52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), in which a female officer was dis­
charged four years prior to retirement after her partner in a previous long-term relationship 
reported their involvement to the Army). 
33. Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142, 154 (1995). 
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One of the weaknesses of advocacy on behalf of gay servicemem­
bers under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a tendency to exaggerate the 
irrationality of the policy, and Don't succumbs to that same tempta­
tion. Exaggeration is hardly necessary, as the policy is quite irrational 
on its own. Unfortunately, hyperbole can take the place of considered 
criticism, just as the semantics of status and conduct took the place of 
attention to practical consequence in devising litigation strategy. 
As an example, Halley mischaracterizes the difference between 
conduct that, under DOD regulation, can trigger an investigation and 
conduct that, under the Statute, can constitute a basis for discharge. 
Conduct that can trigger an investigation comprises a much broader 
category than conduct that warrants discharge, in the same sense that 
the scope of information subject to discovery is broader than the scope 
of evidence admissible at trial. Discharges must be based on prohib­
ited statements or conduct, while investigations designed to discover 
prohibited statements or conduct can be initiated solely on the basis of 
credible information tending to suggest a servicemember's propensity 
for same-sex intimacy. 
Halley is absolutely correct to criticize a regulatory scheme that 
permits commanders to initiate an investigation "on the basis of con­
duct that makes them think a servicemember is gay" (p. 110). This is 
the very reason that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is no different in scope 
from its earlier, presumably more status-based, version.34 It takes a 
good point too far, however, to allege that the military is actually dis­
charging people on the basis of behavior that merely "looks gay" (pp. 
2; 5; 51-52; 109; 115). No discharge proceeding under "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell" has ever imposed a burden to disprove propensity for 
same-sex intimacy on any basis other than the servicemember's verbal 
or written statement to the effect of "I am gay." Therefore, it is ex­
tremely misleading to suggest, for example, that servicemembers can 
34. "Credible information" justifying further investigation includes a report of "behav­
ior that amounts to a non-verbal statement by a member that he or she is a homosex­
ual . . . .  " Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries, supra note 30, at enclosure 3.A4.l.3.4.3. The 
potentially limitless range of pedestrian behavior that would be probative of a servicemem­
ber's intimate life is, paradoxically, restricted only by an express exemption for some of the 
most stereotypically gay (and disproportionately male) associational activity, such as going 
to gay bars, reading gay magazines, and marching in gay rights parades. "Such activity, in 
and of itself, does not provide evidence of homosexual conduct." Id. at enclosure 
3.A4.l.3.3.4. In her congressional testimony, Jamie Gorelick, General Counsel for the 
Department of Defense, emphasized that commanders in the field would have the discretion 
to determine whether information was sufficiently credible to initiate an investigation, par­
ticularly under "gray area" circumstances not specifically addressed by regulation. See As­
sessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the 
Military Forces and Personnel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103d 
Cong. 178-79 (1993) [hereinafter House Military Forces Hearings]. The nature of the con­
duct that would justify the initiation of a factual investigation by a commander is perhaps the 
most important aspect of how "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" will affect gay servicemembers on a 
routine basis. Once an investigation begins, given enough interest, time, and effort, it is 
likely that disqualifying statements or conduct will be discovered. 
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be discharged for the style of their haircuts or their failure to fit the 
expected gender stereotype (p. 2). Such hyperbole obscures the effort 
to explain how the policy impacts servicemembers on a routine and 
not a test-case basis.35 
Exaggerations of the way in which the policy operates inevitably 
lead to assertions that, by association, weaken credible arguments. 
One strategy is to contend that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" will result in 
discharges of heterosexual servicemembers, presumably justifying re­
form either because the Statute is inaccurate in its identification of gay 
individuals or, more realistically, because the Statute is now harming 
citizens of concern to the military. Halley speculates, for example, 
that "[w]hen a commander thinks that women who want to serve in 
the military are probably lesbians, every act of every woman in that 
unit manifests a propensity" (p. 5) and that "few servicemembers can 
possibly be so unambiguously straight that they will never wonder 
whether a reasonable person might construe their actions as homosex­
ual conduct" (p. 118). 
Advocates have consistently failed to offer representative exam­
ples of how the exclusionary policy most commonly affects gay 
servicemembers, so Don't cannot be entirely faulted for following that 
lead. These arguments are harmful, however, not only because there 
is absolutely no evidence that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is leading to 
discharges of straight servicemembers,36 but also because they trivial­
ize the effect the policy actually does have on gay servicemembers. 
When people lead heterosexual lives their everyday behavior rou­
tinely tends to indicate a propensity for heterosexual conduct and rou­
tinely tends to immunize them from scrutiny under "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell. "37 The reason that gay servicemembers are so severely affected 
35. What is the benefit, for example, of raising spurious allegations that the military 
violates "Don't Ask" restrictions when advocates could instead focus on actual violations or, 
even more productively, highlight the unconscionable effect of the Statute even when ap­
plied according to its terms? Halley criticizes the military for questioning servicemembers 
about their sexual status and conduct after they had already made public statements ac­
knowledging that they were gay. See pp. 50-51, 113-14. The original idea was, of course, 
"Don't Ask," not "Don't Ever Ask." It is certainly a lesser intrusion, and one authorized by 
the regulatory scheme, to "ask" once a servicemember has already violated the Statute by 
making a statement. 
36. See Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 52-54 (1999) 
[hereinafter Mazur, A Call to Arms] (examining the assumption that servicemen frequently 
retaliate against servicewomen who refuse their sexual advances by threatening their careers 
with accusations of homosexuality). 
37. See Melissa S. Herbert, Guarding the Nation, Guarding Ourselves: The Management 
of Hetero/Homo/Sexuality Among Women in the Military, 15 MINERVA: Q. REP. ON 
WOMEN & MIL. 60 (1997) <http://www.softlineweb.com/bin/KaStasGw.exe?k_a=nscmqt.1. 
searchwin.W> (surveying whether female servicemembers and veterans, both gay and 
straight, had altered their behavior while in the military to avoid accusations of homosexual­
ity; finding that only one in ten straight women engaged in behavior designed to create an 
aura of heterosexuality, while five in ten gay women did so). "Although homophobia affects 
all women, there is no reason we would expect a significant number of heterosexual women 
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by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is that the most routine aspects of their 
everyday conduct will eventually reveal credible information that they 
do, in fact, lead gay lives. When legal arguments emphasize theoreti­
cal harms to straight servicemembers rather than pragmatic conse­
quences for gay servicemembers, they blur the actual reach of the 
policy and dilute the strength of arguments for its revision or repeal. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISCRETION 
There is no question that the environment in which gay citizens 
perform military service has grown more burdensome and more intru­
sive in the years since the enactment of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The 
more difficult question is why this circumstance has come to be. 
Halley finds the cause in subtle revisions to the language of the mili­
tary's exclusionary policy that now permit the manipulative exercise of 
military discretion (p. 107). This legalistic perspective, however -
one that had to be stretched to identify even small semantic differ­
ences - prevents consideration of larger institutional influences that 
shape the way in which the policy operates in practice. Perhaps it is 
the special weakness of lawyers to focus on the significance of words 
to the exclusion of context, but in this instance that weakness has 
made it more difficult to construct a persuasive case for reform. 
An analogy based on a comparison of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" to 
the small number of remaining criminal statutes prohibiting adultery 
may illustrate this distinction between language and institutional con­
text. The handful of state adultery statutes not yet repealed are obso­
lete and no longer enforced; the military's adultery prohibition, how­
ever, is still actively prosecuted.38 If one were interested in examining 
the comparative burden that these statutes impose on the sexual lives 
of citizens of various jurisdictions, the most significant factor for study 
probably would not be any subtle drafting differences in how these 
crimes were statutorily defined. The far more significant factor in as­
sessing comparative burden would be the degree to which, and the 
manner in which, the statutes were enforced. Two statutes that de­
fined adultery in different ways, but were equally without enforce­
ment, would impose equally negligible burdens. Two identically 
drafted statutes, however, would impose very different burdens on 
citizens if one was enforced and the other was not. 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is analogous in that the exclusionary pol­
icy has been subject to great variation in discretionary enforcement. 
to be so sensitive to this fact that they would consciously work to avoid such labeling. It may 
be that their everyday behaviors are enough to allay suspicions." Id. at 72. 
38. See C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fraterniza­
tion, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (1999); Major William T. Barto, 
The Scarlet Letter and the Military Justice System, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1997, at 3. 
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Much as it may be a surprise to advocates whose first exposure to the 
policy came in the era of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the military has in 
the recent past exerdsed a significant amount of discretion in nonen­
forcement of the policy. This is not to suggest, of course, that gay 
servicemembers were unaffected by their official exclusion, but rather 
that the policy was leavened during the previous generation by a sig­
nificant level of awareness of the service of gay citizens and a signifi­
cant degree of sentiment that the policy should not be enforced. 
Randy Shilts's Conduct Unbecoming'9 illustrates the conflicted 
combination of widespread nonenforcement and sporadic over­
enforcement of the policy that characterized the era between the 
Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts.40 Shilts documents the not un­
common understanding of both commissioned and noncommissioned 
officers that the gay servicemembers within their units were necessary 
to the mission and that it would be counterproductive to seek their 
discharge. As just one of a number of examples,41 Shilts cites the ex­
perience of one former Pentagon official who found consistently 
strong support for reversal of the exclusionary policy throughout the 
senior officer and enlisted ranks during his presentations on Air Force 
bases, under circumstances in which public posturing was unneces­
sary.42 It was also not particularly uncommon during this era for sen­
ior officers to recognize implicitly the gay partners of servicemembers 
and include them in social events.43 Enforcement of the exclusionary 
policy was driven much more by individual predilection or bias than 
institutional understanding. 
This is the institutional discretion we have lost in the era of "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell," a discretion that historically has been found not in 
the policy's language but in its nonenforcement. The reason we see 
tremendous increases in the numbers of gay servicemembers dis­
charged after the enactment of a policy that was presumably designed 
to provide some small window of opportunity for service is because 
the military now operates with a clear institutional mandate of full, 
even obsessive, enforcement. 
Halley's work does examine the military's use of discretion, but 
she searches for the source of that discretion within the language of 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" rather than within the institution itself. Her 
statutory analysis disregards the reality that the military is an inher-
39. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. 
MILITARY (1993). 
40. The discretionary enforcement of the policy might be compared to the danger of 
being hit by lightning. While it was statistically unlikely that an individual gay servicemem­
ber would be hit, if that servicemember was hit, he or she was really going to get burned. 
41. See SHILTS, supra note 39, at 236, 307-11, 389, 531-39, 645. 
42 See id. at 460. 
43. See id. at 532-34. 
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ently discretionary world, with a commander's discretion nearly sacro­
sanct; the degree of discretion exercised outside the language of mili­
tary law will certainly exceed that exercised within it. 
Halley overestimates the relationship between statutory language 
and the exercise of military discretion when, for example, she criticizes 
the Statute's "starkly different procedural tracks for personnel ac­
cused of same-sex sodomy and those accused of cross-sex consensual 
sodomy" (pp. 37-38). In an effort to ameliorate what was perhaps the 
most severe application of the exclusionary policy, the military agreed 
as part of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" that it would no longer refer for 
criminal prosecution - and potential imprisonment - allegations of 
consensual sodomy between individuals of the same sex. Instead the 
matter would be handled as an administrative violation justifying dis­
charge under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."44 
This shift from "a formally neutral procedure," under which both 
heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers would theoretically be 
subject to criminal prosecution for sodomy, to "an explicitly discrimi­
natory one," under which commanders can make a discretionary 
choice to retain heterosexual violators, draws Halley's criticism (p. 
38). But certainly she could not have preferred the alternative. This 
revision does not establish "starkly different procedural tracks"; it 
continues the long-standing discretionary understanding of nonen­
forcement against heterosexual violators of the sodomy law. "Proce­
dure" cannot be a relevant factor when allegations of consensual het­
erosexual sodomy are nonexistent and commanders are never asked to 
make conscious decisions whether to prosecute those violations. Het­
erosexual sodomy is not protected by a procedural privilege; it is pro­
tected by an accepted practice of nonenforcement. 
Similarly, Halley charges that the Statute provides an explicitly 
status-based, procedural privilege for self-identifying heterosexuals to 
engage in homosexual intimate conduct (p. 39). Halley refers to a 
provision of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" carried forward from its prede­
cessor that allows a servicemember to be retained despite having en­
gaged in same-sex intimacy if the conduct "is a departure from the 
member's usual and customary behavior," "is unlikely to recur," and 
"was not accomplished by use of force"; the servicemember's reten­
tion is consistent with "proper discipline, good order, and morale"; 
and the servicemember "does not have a propensity or intent to en­
gage in homosexual acts."45 Halley argues that this procedural privi­
lege "protects heterosexual persons from any status-like consequences 
of their homosexual acts" (pp. 46-47). 
44. See Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the Defense Criminal Investigative Or­
ganizations and Other DOD Law Enforcement Organizations, DOD Instruction 5505.8 (Feb. 
28, 1994) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil>. 
45. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(l)(A)-(E) (1994). 
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This provision is a common focus of criticism for advocates chal­
lenging the policy.46 Why should self-identified heterosexuals be per­
mitted to engage in same-sex intimacy if that conduct is detrimental in 
a military environment? One could question how large a problem the 
military has with self-identified heterosexuals seeking protection for 
their same-sex intimate conduct. But even disregarding this particular 
logical weakness, Halley fails to cite a single instance in which this 
statutory defense has been applied. The likelihood that servicemem­
bers who engage in same-sex intimacy will be able to convince the 
military that they are, in fact, heterosexual is almost nil.47 "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell" actually provides a certain linguistic symmetry (in contrast 
to Halley's charge of "subtle asymmetry" (p. 47)) in its treatment of 
prohibited statements and conduct. In both cases, the opportunity to 
demonstrate a lack of propensity for same-sex intimacy leaves a statu­
tory window for retention of gay servicemembers that is technically 
open but practically closed. 
The statutory revisions to the military's exclusionary policy leading 
to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are irrelevant to the deterioration of the 
conditions under which gay servicemembers live. The policy has not 
changed; the military has changed, and for two reasons. First, the 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate itself changed the nature of the mili­
tary. For the duration of the winter, spring, and summer of 1993, the 
military held, in effect, an institutional "teach in" that conveyed to its 
members the complete incompatibility of homosexuality with military 
service and the importance of discovering and expelling gay service­
members within their midst. Statements by some of the military's 
most respected representatives contributed to an atmosphere of fear, 
disgust, and violence,48 and the recent tragedy in which a young Army 
enlisted man was beaten to death by his fellow servicemembers simply 
46. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 712-13 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Wald, J., 
dissenting); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 n.11 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("However, DOD is prepared to take the risk that a servicemember who has commit­
ted a homosexual act but isn't homosexual won't do so again. For that reason, its argument 
is not wholly rational."). 
47. The exception is probably intended to apply to circumstances in which the consen­
sual or intentional nature of the sexual conduct is unclear. See Matlovich v. Secretary of the 
Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing, in dicta, intoxication, youth, and undue 
influence as relevant factors under an earlier, but analogous, exception to the rnilitary's ex­
clusionary policy). 
48. See Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be 
Admitted to the Military Even If Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953, 983-91 (1997). 
Ultimately, it was the personal animus that straight servicemembers held for their gay col­
leagues that formed the most effective legal justification for the exclusionary policy. "The 
armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the 
armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of mo­
rale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." 
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (1994). No court, however, has ever questioned the degree to which 
the military fostered the very climate it would use to justify "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." 
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because they thought he was gay49 can fairly be seen as the continuing 
legacy of the strategy of animus the military employed.50 The very ex­
istence of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a continuing lesson for young 
servicemembers that their gay colleagues have no place within the 
military. 
Second, research indicates that the military has become less and 
less politically representative of civilian society over the last twenty 
years.51 With the end of military conscription now one generation 
past, we have lost the draft-era officers and enlisted men that made 
the military a much more representative force. In its place we have a 
military in which young officers are increasingly "hard-right 
Republican, largely comfortable with the views of Rush Limbaugh,"52 
an ideological shift that is more extreme in degree than the increasing 
conservatism of American society as a whole. The increasingly parti­
san conservatism of today's military is remarkable in that it has devel­
oped despite the greater representation of women, and alarming in 
that political neutrality was once a professional ethic of military offi­
cers. "On the face of it, a large military that is becoming more politi­
cally active at the same time that it is increasingly concentrated on one 
end of the partisan and ideological spectrum is a cause for concem."53 
Given this convergence of social conservatism and military culture, the 
military's fundamental(ist) resistance to national service by gay citi­
zens is unsurprising. The disappointment is that we may have been 
politically closer to an acceptance of the contribution of gay service­
members twenty years ago than we are today. 
49. See Francis X. Clines, For Gay Soldier, a Daily Barrage of Threats and Slurs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, § 1, at 33. 
50. There is some hope that this animus could diminish when the military no longer re­
minds servicemembers quite so often of the dangers presented by the presence of gay col­
leagues. According to periodic surveys taken by Professors Charles Moskos and Laura 
Miller, opposition to military service by gay citizens has steadily declined in the years since 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." The percentage of male servicemembers who "strongly disagree" 
with a proposal to end the exclusionary policy has declined precipitously from 62% in April 
1992 to 36% in August 1998. The percentage of men who are "not sure" whether gay 
servicemembers should be admitted or excluded has almost quadrupled, from 6% in April 
1992 to 22% in August 1998. See Charles Moskos & Laura L. Miller, Nomandom Surveys of 
Army Personnel (1998) (unpublished survey data, on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
51. See OLE R. HOLST!, A WIDENING GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CMLIAN 
SOCIETY? SOME EVIDENCE, 1976-1996 (Project on U.S. Post Cold-War Civil-Military Rela­
tions Working Paper No. 13, 1997). The increasing ideological gap between the United 
States military and the society it is sworn to protect has become such a matter of concern 
that the October 1999 biennial conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces 
and Society, the preeminent association dedicated to military research and scholarship, de­
voted two panels to the topic ("The Role of Institutions in the Civil-Military Culture Gap"; 
"What Is the U.S. Civil-Military Gap and What Does It Matter?"). 
52. THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING THE CORPS 280 (1997); see also Mazur, A Call to Arms, 
supra note 36 (arguing that increased distance between feminists and the military has con­
tributed to a less representative military). 
53. HOLST!, supra note 51, at 18. 
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V. CONCLUSION: FINDING IRRATIONALITY 
The solution to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" may be, in a sense, as in­
stitutional as the problem. Even though these legislative revisions 
amounted to a distinction without a difference with respect to the 
scope of the policy as applied, the road to improvement is no less a le­
gal one. Halley believes that the most significant opportunity for a re­
versal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is in a judicial finding that "it is irra­
tional to protect against conduct-based harm to military effectiveness 
when homosexuals engage in the conduct but not when heterosexuals 
do, or when open homosexuals rather than closeted ones commit it" 
(p. 128). There is no shortage of what could be found lacking in ra­
tional basis under an equal protection challenge to the policy, and 
Halley reviews several of the most likely possibilities: the idea that 
unit cohesion is somehow strengthened by the "legitimation of 
servicemembers' homophobic sensibilities"; that privacy is somehow 
protected by "secretive homosexual presence"; or that exclusion is 
somehow justified as an "accommodation[] to existing anti-gay ani­
mus" (pp. 128-29). 
What Halley does not measure, however, is the influence of institu­
tional deference. The military has been the beneficiary of an extraor­
dinary level of judicial deference to its professional judgment in mat­
ters of national defense and military affairs.54 The Supreme Court, for 
example, stated: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which 
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional 
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili­
tary force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always 
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.55 
Every judicial decision upholding the constitutionality of the military's 
exclusionary policy has relied on this obligation of deference in cred­
iting the military's proffered justifications;56 it may be the single most 
important factor that prevents significant judicial review. 
No one has ever questioned, however, whether the military's com­
petence with respect to the service of gay citizens is any greater than, 
or even equal to, that of the courts. The military's assertion of profes­
sional judgment has never been questioned and the scope of military 
54. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981). 
55. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (finding no justiciable controversy with 
respect to claim seeking judicial evaluation and supervision of Ohio National Guard training 
and operations following the Kent State incident). 
56. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632-34 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. 
California Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 F.3d 794 
(1999); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 
915, 925-27 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(en bane). 
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competence has never been defined; it is almost as if any subject in 
which the military asserts an interest becomes one in which the mili­
tary enjoys special competence.57 With respect to the service of gay 
citizens, however, the military has demonstrated a particular lack of 
competence. 
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the 
time "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" was adopted, revealed a breathtaking 
depth of ignorance when he testified to his belief that in three decades 
in the military he had never served with a gay servicemember - ex­
cept for those who had been discovered and discharged.58 It is very 
difficult to reconcile General Powell's deliberate ignorance (or un­
truthfulness) with any judicial conclusion that the military deserves 
deference on the basis of its professional competence.59 The military 
purports to understand the effect that gay servicemembers have on 
mission effectiveness even though it drives the routine lives of those 
individuals underground and fosters fear and misunderstanding as a 
substitute. The military's professional judgment with respect to gay 
servicemembers has not been complex, subtle, or professional; there is 
perhaps no institution with less competence on the subject. 
57. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan J., joined by 
Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If a branch of the military declares one of its rules sufficiently im­
portant to outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that the Court will ac­
cept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be."). 
58. See House Military Forces Hearings, supra note 34, at 62 (testimony of Gen. Colin 
Powell) ("I do not know any who were not discharged in the course of their service. I don't 
personaJiy know of any who completed service."). Three other members of the Joint Chiefs 
professed a similar level of ignorance. See id. 
59. General Powell's testimony was not challenged during the hearing, and it is possible 
that he sincerely believes he has never personally known a gay servicemember who has 
completed a term of military service. Given the tens of thousands of servicemembers with 
whom General Powell would have had some level of personal contact during his distin­
guished career, however, I find his testimony incredible - and convenient. Had General 
Powell admitted he knowingly served with gay people, he would have had to explain why he 
failed to seek their discharge, given his stated belief that open awareness of homosexuality is 
detrimental to military effectiveness. 
My personal experience in military service during the late 1970s and early 1980s is that 
the vast majority of servicemembers were well aware of the sexual orientation of at least 
some of their gay colleagues. Recent statements by presidential candidate (and former naval 
aviator) John McCain are consistent with my experience. McCain noted in a very matter-of­
fact fashion that he served with a number of gay people in the military. He explained that he 
was aware of that ordinary reality during his years of service because "we know by behavior 
and by attitudes." "I think that it's clear to some of us when some people have that lifestyle." 
Mike Allen, McCain Says He Can Identify Gays By Behavior, Attitudes, WASH. POST, Jan. 
18, 2000, at A4; see also Scott Shuger, The Mark of McCain, SLATE MAG., Jan. 18, 2000, 
available in LEXI S, News Library, News Group File (interpreting McCain's statement to 
mean that "gaydar is pretty much universal"). 
McCain's statements underscore the difficulty for gay servicemembers under "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell." The same ordinary behavior that informed him some of his colleagues 
were gay would constitute "credible information " warranting investigation by the military. 
See Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries, supra note 30, at enclosure 3.A4.1.3.4.3. 
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Judicial deference to military policy decisions should be inappro­
priate under circumstances in which the "professional competence" at 
issue is derived from little more than assumptions about the charac­
teristic behavior of groups of people. Professional judgment with re­
spect to matters of a military nature has had a questionable history 
when based on predictions concerning how certain groups of people 
will most likely behave or how significantly their predicted behavior 
will affect military readiness. 
Korematsu v. United States00 is the infamous example. The military 
chose a policy of internment for American citizens of Japanese ances­
try based on a professional judgment that some might contribute to 
the Japanese war effort. Another professional judgment concerning 
military readiness was upheld in Rostker v. Goldberg,61 in which 
Congress concluded that women would be of insufficient utility in a 
war effort to justify their registration for the draft. Without the pro­
tection of judicial deference that excuses military decisionmaking from 
any serious review, courts would be significantly more likely to discuss 
openly the irrationalities of professional judgment under "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell." 
When causation is institutional in origin, the solution is likely insti­
tutional as well. The word games that resulted in "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell" failed to engage more fundamental questions of why the place of 
gay citizens within the military is eroding and why the lives of gay 
servicemembers are more difficult. Those word games also failed to 
engage the manner in which the military itself is changing. If citizens 
who serve in the military are becoming less and less politically repre­
sentative of the citizens they protect and more partisanly conservative 
in their influence, the consequences are important not only for gay 
servicemembers but for women in the military as well. If a critical ex­
amination of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" leads to reconsideration of how 
we as a society choose who will serve in the military and the conditions 
under which those citizens serve, a broken policy might someday be 
seen as the beginning of positive reform. 
60. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
61. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
